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Abstract—The availability of high-fidelity energy networks
brings significant value to academic and commercial research.
However, such releases also raise fundamental concerns related
to privacy and security as they can reveal sensitive commercial
information and expose system vulnerabilities. This paper inves-
tigates how to release the data for power networks where the
parameters of transmission lines and transformers are obfuscated.
It does so by using the framework of Differential Privacy
(DP), that provides strong privacy guarantees and has attracted
significant attention in recent years. Unfortunately, simple DP
mechanisms often result in AC-infeasible networks. To address
these concerns, this paper presents a novel differentially private
mechanism that guarantees AC-feasibility and largely preserves
the fidelity of the obfuscated power network. Experimental results
also show that the obfuscation significantly reduces the potential
damage of an attack carried by exploiting the released dataset.
I. INTRODUCTION
The availability of test cases representing high-fidelity
power system networks is fundamental to foster research
in optimal power flow, unit commitment, and transmission
planning, to name only a few challenging problems. This
need was recognized by ARPA-E when it initiated the Grid
Data Program in 2015. However, the release of such rich
datasets is challenging due to legal issues related to privacy
and national security. For instance, the electrical load of an
industrial customer indirectly exposes sensitive information
on its production levels and strategic investments, and the
value parameters of lines and generators may reveal how
transmission operators operate their networks. Furthermore,
this data could be exploited by an attacker to inflict targeted
damages on the network infrastructure.
This paper explores whether differential privacy can help
to mitigate these concerns. Differential Privacy (DP) [1] is
an algorithmic property that measures and bounds the privacy
risks associated with answering sensitive queries or releasing
a privacy-preserving dataset. It introduces carefully calibrated
noise to the data to prevent the disclosure of sensitive infor-
mation. An algorithm satisfying DP offers privacy protection
regardless of the external knowledge of an attacker. In partic-
ular, the definition of DP adopted in this paper ensures that
an attacker obtaining access to a differentially private output,
cannot detect (with high probability) how close is the privacy-
preserving value to its original one.
However, DP faces significant challenges when the resulting
privacy-preserving datasets are used as inputs to complex
optimization algorithms, e.g., Optimal Power Flow (OPF)
problems. Indeed, the privacy-preserving dataset may have lost
the fidelity and realism of the original data and may even
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not admit feasible solutions for the optimization problems of
interest [2].
This paper studies how to address such a challenge when
the goal is to preserve the privacy of line parameters and
transformers. It presents a DP mechanism to release data
for power networks that is realistic and limits the power of
an attacker. More precisely, the contribution of this paper is
fourfold. (1) It proposes the Power Line Obfuscation (PLO)
mechanism to obfuscate the line parameters in a power sys-
tem network. (2) It shows that PLO has strong theoretical
properties: It achieves -differential privacy, it ensures that
the released data can produce feasible solutions for OPF
problems, and its objective value is a constant factor away
from optimality. (3) It extends the PLO mechanism to handle
time-series network data. (4) It demonstrates, experimentally,
that the PLO mechanism improves the accuracy of existing
approaches. When tested on the largest collection of OPF test
cases available, it results in solutions with similar costs and
optimality gaps to those obtained on the original problems,
while also protecting well against an attacker that has access to
the released data and uses it to damage the real power network.
Interestingly, on the test cases adopted, the damage inflicted on
the real power network, when the attacker exploits the PLO-
obfuscated data, converges to that of a random, uninformed
attack as the privacy level increases.
II. RELATED WORK
There is a rich literature on theoretical results of DP (see,
for instance, the excellent surveys [3] and [4]). The literature
on DP applied to energy systems includes considerably fewer
efforts. A´cs and Castelluccia [5] exploit a direct applica-
tion of the Laplace mechanism to hide user participation
in smart meter data sets, achieving -DP. Zhao et al. [6]
study a DP schema that exploits the ability of households to
charge/discharge a battery to hide the real energy consumption
of their appliances. Halder et al. [7] propose an DP-based
architecture to support privacy-preserving thermal inertial load
management at an aggregated level. Liao et al. [8] introduce
Di-PriDA, a privacy-preserving mechanism for appliance-level
peak-time load balancing control in the smart grid, aimed
at masking the consumption of the top-k appliances of a
household.
Karapetyan et al. [9] empirically quantify the trade-off
between privacy and utility in demand response systems. The
authors analyze the effects of a simple Laplace mechanism
on the objective value of the demand response optimization
problem. Their experiments on a 4-bus micro-grid show drastic
results: the optimality gap approaches nearly 90% in some
cases. Eibl and Engel [10] studied the effect of DP-based
aggregation schemes on the utility of real smart meter data, and
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[11] studies the impact of applying a DP approach to protect
metering data used for load forecasting. Zhou et al. [12] have
recently studied the problem of releasing differential private
network statistics obtained from solving a Direct Current (DC)
optimal power flow problem.
A differential private schema that uses constrained post-
processing was recently introduced by Fioretto et al. [2] and
adopted to protect load consumption in power networks. In
contrast, the proposed PLO mechanism releases the obfuscated
network data protecting the line parameters imposing con-
straints to ensure that the problem solution cost is close to the
solution cost of the original problem, and that the underlying
optimal power flow constraints are satisfiable.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section reviews the AC Optimal Power Flow (AC-
OPF) problem and key concepts from differential privacy. A
summary of the notation adopted is tabulated in Table I. Bold-
faced symbols are used to denote constant values.
A. AC Optimal Power Flow
Optimal Power Flow (OPF) is the problem of determining
the most economical generator dispatch to serve demands
while satisfying operating and feasibility constraints. AC-
OPF refers to modeling the full AC power equations when
computing an OPF. This paper views the grid as a graph
pN,Eq where N is the set of buses and E is the set of
transmission lines and transformers, called lines for simplicity.
We use E to represent the set of directed arcs and ER to refer
to the arcs in E with the reverse direction. The AC power
flow equations use complex quantities for current I , voltage
V , admittance Y , and power S. The quantities are linked by
constraints expressing Kirchhoff’s Current Law (KCL) and
Ohm’s Law, resulting in the AC Power Flow equations:
Sgi ´ Sdi “
ÿ
pi,jqPEYER
Sij @i P N
Sij “ Y ˚ij |Vi|2 ´ Y ˚ij ViVj˚ pi, jq P E Y ER
These non-convex nonlinear equations are the core building
block in many power system applications and Model 1 depicts
the AC-OPF formulation. The objective function (1) minimizes
the cost of the generator dispatch. Constraint (2) sets the
reference angle for a slack bus s P N to be zero to eliminate
numerical symmetries. Constraints (3) and (4) capture the volt-
age bounds and phase angle difference constraints. Constraints
(5) and (6) enforce the generator output and line flow limits.
Finally, Constraints (7) and (8) capture the AC Power Flow
equations. We use N “ xN,E,S,Y,θ∆, s,vy for a succinct
network description and define m “ |N | and n “ |E|.
B. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [1] is a privacy framework that pro-
tects the disclosure of the participation of an individual to
a dataset. In the context of this paper, differential privacy is
used to protect the disclosure of conductance and susceptance
values of transmission lines. The paper considers datasets
Model 1 The AC Optimal Power Flow Problem (AC-OPF)
variables: Sgi , Vi @i P N, Sij @pi, jq P E Y ER
minimize:
ÿ
iPN
c2ip<pSgi qq2 ` c1i<pSgi q ` c0i (1)
subject to: =Vs “ 0, (2)
vli ď |Vi| ď vui @i P N (3)
´ θ∆ij ď =pViV ˚j q ď θ∆ij @pi, jq P E (4)
Sgli ď Sgi ď Sgui @i P N (5)
|Sij | ď suij @pi, jq P E Y ER (6)
Sgi ´ Sdi “
ř
pi,jqPEYER Sij @i P N (7)
Sij “ Y ˚ij |Vi|2 ´ Y ˚ij ViV ˚j @pi, jq P E Y ER (8)
D “ tg1, . . . , gnu P Rn as n-dimensional real-valued vector
describing conductance values and aims at protecting the
value of each conductance gi up to some quantity α ą 0.
This requirement allows to obfuscate the parameters of lines
whose values are close to one another while keeping the
distinction between line parameters that are far apart from each
other. This privacy notion is characterized by the adjacency
relation between datasets that captures the indistinguishability
of individual line values and defined as:
D „α D1 ô Di s.t. |gi ´ g1i| ď α and gj “ g1j ,@j ‰ i. (9)
where D and D1 are two datasets and α ą 0 is a real value
[13]. Informally speaking, a DP mechanism needs to ensure
that queries on two indistinguishable datasets (i.e., datasets
differing on a single value by at most α) give similar results.
The following definition formalizes this intuition [1], [13].
Definition 1: A randomized algorithm A : D Ñ R with
domain D and range R is -differential private if, for any
output response O Ď R and any two adjacent inputs D „α
D1 P Rn, fixed a value α ą 0,
PrrApDq P Os
PrrApD1q P Os ď exppq. (10)
The level of privacy is controlled by the parameter  ě 0,
called the privacy budget, with small values denoting strong
privacy. The level of indistinguishability is controlled by
the parameter α ą 0. Differential privacy satisfies several
important properties, including composability and immunity to
post-processing [3].
Theorem 1 (Sequential Composition): The composition
pA1pDq, . . . ,AkpDqq of a collection tAiuki“1 of i-differential
private algorithms satisfies přki“1 iq-differential privacy.
Theorem 2 (Parallel Composition): Let D1 and D2 be
disjoint subsets of D and A be an -differential private
algorithm. Computing ApD X D1q and ApD X D2q satisfies
-differential privacy.
Theorem 3 (Post-Processing Immunity): Let A be an -
differential private algorithm and g be an arbitrary mapping
from the set of possible output sequences to an arbitrary set.
Then, g ˝A is -differential private.
A function (also called query) Q : Rn Ñ R can be made
differential private by injecting random noise to its output.
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TABLE I
POWER NETWORK NOMENCLATURE.
N The set of nodes in the network θ∆ Phase angle difference limits
E The set of from edges in the network Sd “ pd ` iqd AC power demand
ER The set of to edges in the network Sg “ pg ` iqg AC power generation
i Imaginary number constant c0, c1, c2 Generation cost coefficients
n, m |E| and |N |, respectively <p¨q Real component of a complex number
S “ p` iq AC power =p¨q Imaginary component of a complex number
V “ v=θ AC voltage Y “ g ` ib Line admittance
| ¨ | Magnitude of a complex number = Angle of a complex number
su Line apparent power thermal limit xl, xu Lower and upper bounds of x
θij Phase angle difference (i.e., θi ´ θj ) x A constant value
N A network description g Network’s line conductances
b Network’s line susceptances ∆Q Query sensitivity
 Privacy budget α Indistinguishability value
β Faithfulness parameter x˜ Privacy-preserving version of x
9x Post-processed version of x˜ x˚ Complex conjugate of x
The amount of noise to inject depends on the sensitivity of
the query, denoted by ∆Q and defined as
∆Q “ max
D„αD1
››QpDq ´QpD1q››
1
.
For instance, querying the conductance values of a line from
a dataset D is achieved through an identity query Q, whose
sensitivity ∆Q “ α. The Laplace distribution with 0 mean
and scale b, denoted by Lappλq, has a probability density
function Lappx|λq “ 12λe´
|x|
λ . It can be used to obtain an -
differential private algorithm to answer numeric queries [1]. In
the following, Lappλqn denotes the i.i.d. Laplace distribution
over n dimensions with parameter λ.
Theorem 4 (Laplace Mechanism): Let Q be a numeric
query that maps datasets to Rn. The Laplace mechanism that
outputs QpDq ` z, where z P Rn is drawn from the Laplace
distribution Lap
´
∆Q

¯n
, achieves -differential privacy.
IV. THE OBFUSCATION MECHANISM FOR POWER LINES
A. Problem Setting and Attack Model
A power grid operator desires to release a network de-
scription N˜ “ xN,E,S, Y˜,θ∆, s,vy of a network N “
xN,E,S,Y,θ∆, s,vy, that obfuscates the lines admittance
values Y within a given indistinguishability parameter α. In
addition, the released data must preserve the realism of the
original network. The lines parameters are considered to be
extremely sensitive as they can reveal important operational
information that can be exploited by an attacker to inflict
targeted damages on the network infrastructure [14], [15]. The
paper assumes that the optimal dispatch cost OpN q and typical
conductance-susceptance line ratios are publicly available and
thus accessible by an attacker. This is not restrictive since the
optimal dispatch cost can be inferred from market clearing
prices which are publicly accessible, and the ratios between
conductance and susceptance of a line can be retrieved from
the manufacture informational material.
This paper also considers an attack model in which a
malicious user can disrupt k power lines (called attack budget)
to inflict maximal network damage. It further assumes that the
Model 2 Maximum Load Restoration
variables: Sgi , Vi, li @i P N, Sij @pi, jq P E Y ER
maximize:
ÿ
iPN
li<pSdi q (11)
subject to: p2q–p8q (12)
0 ď li ď 1 @i P N (13)
Sgi ´ liSdi “
ř
pi,jqPEYER Sij @i P N (14)
attacker has full knowledge of a network description N and
can use it to estimate the damages inflicted by its actions. To
measure the impact of an attack on the power network, this
paper measures the total load affected and the amount of the
affected loads that can be restored via Model 2. The latter aims
at maximizing the active load li<pSdi q served by the damaged
network while preserving the active/reactive factor.
B. The PLO Problem
The Power Lines Obfuscation (PLO) problem establishes
the fundamental desiderata to be delivered by the obfusca-
tion mechanism. It operates on the line conductances and
suceptances, which are denoted by g “ tgijupi,jqPE and
b “ tbijupi,jqPE , respectively.
Definition 2 (PLO problem): Given a network description
N and positive real values α, β, and , the PLO problem
produces a network description N˜ that satisfies:
1) Lines obfuscation: The lines conductances g˜ of N˜ sat-
isfy -differential privacy under α-indistinguishability.
2) Consistency: N˜ have feasible solutions to the OPF
Constraints (2)–(8).
3) Objective faithfulness: N˜ must be faithful to the
value of the objective function up to a factor β, i.e.,
|OpN q´OpN˜ q|
OpN q ď β.
Finding values g˜ satisfying α-indistinguishability is readily
achieved through the Laplace mechanism. However, finding
values Y˜ that satisfy conditions (2) and (3) is more challeng-
ing. Indeed, these conditions require that the new network
N˜ satisfies the AC power flow equations, the operational
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constraints, and closely preserves the objective value. In other
words, these conditions ensure the realism and fidelity of N˜ .
C. The PLO Mechanism
The PLO mechanism, described in Algorithm 1, addresses
these challenges. It takes as input a power network description
N , its optimal dispatch cost, denoted as O˚, as well as three
positive real numbers: , which determines the privacy value of
the private data, α, which determines the indistinguishability
value, and β, which determines the required faithfulness to the
value of the objective function.
The PLO mechanism relies on three, independent, private
data estimations, each of which requires the addition of
carefully calibrated noise to guarantee privacy. It first injects
Laplace noise with parameter λ “ 3α{ to the output of each
query on each dimension of the conductance vector g of N
resulting in new noisy conductance and susceptances vectors:
g˜ “ g ` Lap
ˆ
3α

˙n
, b˜ “ r ¨ g˜, (15)
as shown in lines 1–2 of Algorithm 1, where g˜ “ tg˜ijupijqPE
and b˜ “ tb˜ijupijqPE are the vectors of noisy conductances
and suceptances, r is the vector of ratios t gijbij upijqPE between
g and b, and ¨ denotes the dot-product. Note that, importantly,
the mechanism retains the conductance-susceptance ratio.
It is also important to ensure that the line values within
different voltage levels preserve their differences. Denote by
VLpN q as the set of voltage levels in N . For each voltage
level v, the PLO mechanism computes the noisy mean value
of the conductance vector g (lines 3 and 4):
µ˜vg “
¨˝
1
nv
ÿ
pijqPEpvq
gij‚˛` Lapˆ 3α
nv
˙
, (16)
and suceptance b:
µ˜vb “
¨˝
1
nv
ÿ
pijqPEpvq
bij‚˛` Lapˆ 3α
nv
˙
, (17)
where Epvq denotes the subset of lines at voltage level v, and
nv “ |Epvq|. These estimates are used to guarantee that the
parameters of the lines do not deviate too much from their
original values within each voltage level.
While the application of the Laplace noise to produce
new conductance and susceptance vectors satisfies condition
1 of Definition 2, it may not satisfy conditions 2 and 3. In
fact, Section VI shows that the Laplace noise induced on
the parameters of the lines often result in a new network
description which admits no feasible flow. To overcome this
limitation, the PLO mechanism post-processes the noisy values
b˜ and g˜ by exploiting an optimization model specified in line 5
of Algorithm 1. The result of such an optimization-based post-
processing step is a new network 9N “ xN,E,S, 9Y,θ∆, s,vy
that satisfies the objective faithfulness and consistency require-
ments of Definition 2.
The optimization model minimizes the sum of the L2-
distances between the variables 9g P Rn and the noisy
Algorithm 1: The PLO mechanism for the AC-OPF
input : xN ,O˚, , α, βy
1 g˜Ð g ` Lapp 3α qn
2 b˜Ð r ¨ g˜
3 foreach v P VLpN q do
4 µ˜vx Ð 1n
ř
pijqPEpvq xij ` Lapp 3αnv q (for x “ g,b)
5 Solve the following model:
variables: Sgi , Vi @i P N
9Yij , Sij @pi, jq P EkYERk
minimize: } 9g ´ g˜}22 ` } 9b´ b˜}22 (s1)
subject to:
(2)–(7)ˇˇ ř
iPN costpSgi q ´O˚
ˇˇ
O˚ ď β (s2)
Sij “ 9Y ˚ij |Vi|2 ´ 9Y ˚ij ViV ˚j @pi, jq P E Y ER (s3)
@pi, jq P Epvq Y ERpvq, @v P VLpN q :
1
λ
µvg ď 9gij ď λµvg (s4)
1
λ
µvb ď 9bij ď λµvb (s5)
output : 9N “ xN,E,S, 9Y,θ∆, s,vy
conductances g˜ P Rn, and the variables 9b P Rn and
the noisy susceptances b˜ P Rn. The model is subject to
Constraints (2)–(7) of Model 1 with the addition of the β-
faithfulness constraint (s2) that guarantees to satisfy condition
3 of the PLO problem (Definition 2). The notation costpSgi q
is used as a shorthand for c2ip<pSgi qq2 ` c1i<pSgi q ` c0i.
Constraint (s3) enforces the power-flow based on the Ohm’s
Law on the post-processed conductance and suceptance values.
Finally, Constraints (s4) and (s5) bound the values for the
post-processed conductance and susceptance to be close to
their privacy-preserving means, parameterized by a value
λ ą 0. These constraints are used to avoid that the post-
processed values deviate arbitrarily from the original ones.
The optimization also works on a pre-processed network to
ensure the realism and feasibility. This pre-processing ensures
that parallel lines have the same resistance and reactance
parameters and that negative resistance values are not part of
the obfuscation. Moreover, the optimization guarantees that all
remaining resistances are positive.
The PLO mechanism can be thought as redistributing the
noise of the Laplace mechanism applied to the admittance
values of the lines in N to obtain a new network 9N that
is consistent with the problem constraints and objective. It
searches for a feasible solution that satisfies the AC-OPF
constraints and the β-faithfulness constraint.
The following results show that PLO has desirable proper-
ties. All the proofs are in Appendix A.
Theorem 5: For a given α-indistinguishability level, the
PLO mechanism is -differential private.
The following result is a consequence of [2](Theorem 5).
Corollary 1: The optimal solution xg˚,b˚y to the opti-
mization model in line 5 of Algorithm 1 satisfies }g˚´g}2`
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}b˚ ´ b}2 ď 2}g˜ ´ g}2 ` 2}b˜´ b}2.
This last result implies the PLO mechanism is at most a
factor 2 away from optimality. Such a result, in turn, follows
from the optimality of the Laplace mechanism for identity
queries [16]. Note that a solution to the PLO always exists.
Indeed, the original network values Y represent a feasible
solution satisfying all requirements of Definition 2.
V. EXTENSION: MULTI-STEP PLO
The PLO mechanism obfuscates the line parameters based
on a single snapshot (time-point) of the steady state of the
network. To improve the fidelity and realism of the network,
the mechanism can be generalized by reasoning about multiple
snapshots (time-series) of loads and optimal dispatches. Con-
sider a set of network descriptions tNtuht“1 over a finite time
horizon h where the loads and the optimal generator dispatches
are varying over time. Each Nt “ pN,E,St,Y,θ∆, s,vq
represents the steady state of the power grid at time step
0 ă t ď h, and therefore tNtuht“1 represents a network of
time-series data.
The Multi-step Power Lines Obfuscation (MPLO) problem
extends the PLO by enforcing the objective faithfulness con-
dition (Definition 2) for every Nt (t P rhs). The derived
MPLO mechanism is outlined in Appendix B. It extends the
PLO mechanism in taking as input a collection of networks
tNtuht“1 and it returns the admittance values 9Y for the lines
in the power grid that satisfy the conditions of Definition
2. The MPLO mechanism differs from the PLO mechanism
exclusively in the post-processing optimization step of line
5. Observe that the admittance matrix Y containing the
line parameters is constant during the whole time horizon.
Therefore, similarly to PLO, the MPLO mechanism perturbs
the lines parameters only once, prior applying the post-
processing optimization step. Thus, the MPLO mechanism
provides the same privacy guarantees as those provided by
the PLO mechanism.
Theorem 6: For a given α-indistinguishability level, the
MPLO mechanism is -differential private.
The objective of MPLO is equivalent to the objective
(s1) of the post-processing step in the PLO mechanism. In
addition, the model constraints naturally extend those of the
PLO mechanism by considering multiple time steps with a
fixed time horizon. The MPLO mechanism also outputs a
new network whose line parameters 9Y are obfuscated and do
not deviate too far from their privacy-preserving mean values.
However, it further requires the AC-OPF problem constraints
and the β consistency requirement are satisfied for the whole
time series instead of just one time-step. The PLO mechanism
can be seen as a special case of the MPLO mechanism with a
time horizon h “ 1; Hence the PLO mechanism is a relaxation
of MPLO mechanism.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
This section examines the proposed mechanisms on a va-
riety of networks from the NESTA library [17]. It analyzes
the line values produced by the obfuscation procedure, studies
the mechanism ability to preserve the dispatch costs and
TABLE II
LAPLACE MECHANISM FEASIBILITY (%)
α
Network instance 0.001 0.01 ě0.1
nesta case30 ieee 100 80 0
nesta case39 epri 100 0 0
nesta case57 ieee 100 61 0
nesta case118 ieee 100 47 0
optimality gaps (to be defined shortly), determines how well
the resulting network can sustain an attack, and reports the
runtime of the mechanisms. It also extends this analysis to
time-series networks using a multiple-step approach.
For presentation simplicity, the analysis focuses primarily
on the IEEE 39-bus network. However, our results are consis-
tent across the entire NESTA benchmark set. All experiments
use a privacy budget  “ 1.0 and vary the indistinguishability
level α P t10´3, 10´2, 10´1, 1.0u and the faithfulness level
β P t10´2, 10´1u. The model was implemented using the
Julia package PowerModels.jl [18] with the nonlinear solver
IPOPT [19] for solving the various power flow models, in-
cluding the nonlinear AC model and the QC [20], [21] and
SOCP [22] relaxations.
A. Analysis of the Line Parameters
This section studies the realism of the Laplace mechanism.
Table II reports the percentage of feasible instances (over 100
runs) for obfuscated networks obtained using exclusively the
Laplace mechanism on the IEEE-30 bus, IEEE-39 bus, IEEE-
57 bus, and the IEEE-118 bus networks. When the indistin-
guishability values α exceed 0.1, the Laplace-obfuscated net-
works are rarely AC-feasible. In contrast, the PLO mechanism
is always AC-feasible (except for one IEEE-118 instance).
These results justify the need of studying mechanisms that
are more sophisticated than the Laplace mechanism, and hence
the PLO mechanism. Figure 1 illustrates the line resistances
of an IEEE 39-bus network obtained by the Laplace and
the PLO mechanisms and compare them with the associated
values in the original network. The figure reports the results at
varying of the indistinguishability level α and fixing β “ 0.01.
The results indicate that the OPF obfuscated values differ by
at most 1% from their original ones. Not surprisingly, the
differences are more pronounced as the indistinguishability
level increases: For larger indistinguishability levels, the PLO
mechanism introduces more noise and hence more diverse
lines values are generated.
B. Dispatch Costs and Optimality Gaps
The next results evaluate the ability of the PLO-obfuscated
networks to preserve the dispatch costs and optimality gaps.
Optimality gaps measures the relative distance between the
objective value of the AC-OPF problem with one of its
relaxations. It is frequently used as a measure to reflect
the hardness of a problem instance. For our experimental
evaluations, it is used as a proxy to measure whether the
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Fig. 1. IEEE-39 bus line resistances (p.u.) at varying of the indistinguishability level α P t0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1.0u and for β “ 0.01. The x-axis shows values
of the original network and the y-axis shows values of the PLO and Laplace obfuscated networks.
Fig. 2. The IEEE-39 bus AC optimal dispatch costs differences, in percentage,
between the original and the obfuscated networks with faithfulness parameters
β “ 0.01 (left) and 0.1 (right).
structure of an instance changed after applying our proposed
mechanism. Figure 2 shows the difference, in percentage, of
the dispatch costs obtained via the Laplace and the PLO
mechanisms with respect to the original costs at varying of
the indistinguishability level α and the faithfulness parameter
β. The figure illustrates the mean and the standard deviation
(shown with black, solid, lines) obtained on 100 runs, for
each combination of the α and β parameters. Optimality gap
(percentage differences) are measured as: 100ˆ OpN q´OpN˜ qOpN q ,
where N represents the original network, N˜ the obfuscated
network (using the Laplace or the PLO mechanisms), and O
the cost of a (local) optimal solution to the AC-OPF problem.
Parameter α controls the amount of noise being added to the
line parameters, therefore, the OPF costs are close to their
original values when α is small (e.g., ď 10´3). The PLO
mechanism often produces obfuscated network inducing OPFs
with lower costs than the original ones. This is because PLO
returns an AC-feasible solution whose cost is close to that of
the original network, ignoring whether a lower dispatch cost
may exist.
Figure 3 compares the optimality gaps on the QC and
the SOCP relaxations of the AC-OPF obtained using the
original and the PLO-obfuscated networks. The percentage
measures are defined as 100 ˆ |OpN q´ pOpN q|OpN q , where N is
either the original or the obfuscated network, and pO is the
function returning the costs of the QC or the SOCP AC-OPF
relaxation on N . The results are averaged on 100 runs and
show that the optimality gaps attained with the obfuscated
Fig. 3. The IEEE-39 bus optimality gap differences, in percentage, between
the original and the obfuscated networks with faithfulness parameters β “
0.01 (left) and 0.1 (right).
networks are close to those attained with the original ones
for small (ď 10´2) α values. This is important for capturing
the fidelity of the obfuscated network and the difficulty of the
associated OPF. In general, the PLO mechanism increases the
optimality gaps slightly, and these results are consistent across
the NESTA networks.
C. Power Grid Attack Simulation
The next experiment evaluates the damages that an attacker
may inflict on a real power network N , if an obfuscated
counterpart N˜ is released. The attack setting is as follows: An
attacker is given a budget denoting the percentage k of lines it
can damage. The attacker chooses the lines to damage based
on the obfuscated network, but the attack impact is evaluated
on the real network. To assess the benefits of the proposed
obfuscation scheme, in response to such an attack, three attack
strategies are compared:
1) Random Attack: k lines are randomly selected. This
represents a scenario in which an attacker carries an
uninformed attack.
2) Obfuscated Flow Attack: The attacker solves an OPF
problem on the obfuscated network N˜ and chooses the
top-k lines carrying the largest active flows. This case
represents a scenario in which the attacker carries an
informed attack based on the obfuscated network data.
3) Real Flow Attack: The attacker solves an OPF problem
on the real network N and chooses the top-k lines
carrying the largest active flows. This case represents a
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Fig. 4. Percentage of the active load restored after different attacks on the
IEEE-39 bus network bus network with α “ 0.01 (left), 0.1 (center), and 1.0
(right), and β “ 0.01.
Fig. 5. Percentage of the active load restored after different attacks on the
IEEE-118 bus network with α “ 0.01 (left), 0.1 (center), and 1.0 (right),
and β “ 0.01.
scenario in which the real data is released and exploited
by an attacker.
To compare the damages inflicted by the attacks, the
experiments report the load that can be restored after an
attack using the maximum load restoration model described
in Model 2. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the percentage of the
load being restored for each attack strategies, at varying of the
attack budget k P t5, 10, 15u and the indistinguishability value
α P t0.01, 0.1, 1.0u, on the IEEE-39 bus and the IEEE-118 bus
benchmarks, respectively, with faithfulness value β “ 0.01.
The results report the average values of 100 simulations for
each combination of parameters.
The random attacks are used as a baseline to assess the
damage that may be caused by an uninformed attacker. Not
surprisingly, they result in the largest load restoration for each
setting and the restored load decreases as the attack budget
increases. In contrast, the real flow attacks produce the most
significant damage to the networks. In all cases tested, the
load restoration after these attacks were close to 0% after the
attacker reaches a sufficient budget (as low as 5% for IEEE-39
bus and 10% for IEEE-118 bus), meaning that these attacks
are highly effective and extremely harmful.
On the other hand, the results for the Obfuscated Flow At-
tacks show a different pattern. Even though the attacker selects
the lines with the highest flows (in the obfuscated network), the
network ability to restore loads is substantially higher when
compared to those of the real flow attacks. Remarkably, as
the indistinguishability values increase, the strength of the
obfuscated flow attack to inflict damages decreases and its
success rate are close to those of random attacks. This is
because larger indistinguishability implies more noise and thus
higher chance for an attacker to damage less harmful lines.
TABLE III
PLO COMPUTATIONAL RUNTIME
α
Network instance 0.01 0.1 1.0
nesta case3 lmbd 0.04 0.05 0.07
nesta case4 gs 0.09 0.14 0.16
nesta case5 pjm 0.10 0.09 0.15
nesta case6 c 0.05 0.12 0.19
nesta case6 ww 0.05 0.26 0.39
nesta case9 wscc 0.08 0.21 0.29
nesta case14 ieee 0.10 0.44 0.74
nesta case24 ieee rts 0.63 1.04 1.88
nesta case29 edin 4.23 3.26 4.59
nesta case30 as 0.38 1.31 1.77
nesta case30 fsr 0.39 1.43 1.70
nesta case30 ieee 0.43 1.41 1.63
nesta case39 epri 1.67 2.00 2.25
nesta case57 ieee 1.11 3.43 4.81
nesta case73 ieee rts 2.86 8.03 13.90
nesta case89 pegase 33.67 44.96 48.12
nesta case118 ieee 8.79 8.64 17.73
nesta case162 ieee dtc 17.48 38.83 50.43
D. Mechanism Runtimes
Having shown the effectiveness of the PLO mechanism in
generating obfuscated networks, we now analyze its compu-
tational efficiency. Table III tabulates the average runtime, in
seconds, for 100 experiments on several NESTA instances at
varying of the indistinguishability values (α in t0.01, 0.1, 1.0u)
and using the faithfulness value β “ 0.01. In all cases, pro-
ducing an obfuscated network requires less than 60 seconds.
The results illustrate that, in general, the runtime increases
when α increases. Larger α values may result in obfuscated
line parameters that are farther from the original values,
thus affecting the power losses and the feasible power flows.
Therefore, minimizing the PLO optimization model (line 5 of
Algorithm 1) may increase the runtime.
E. MPLO for Time-Series Data
This subsection evaluates the effect of obfuscating a network
with the Multistep PLO mechanism. The experiments use
time-series data tNtuht“1 with a time horizon of h steps,
obtained and computed by varying the load profile in the range
of r80%, 110%s of their original values.
Each time step will be associated with a load profile.
The goal of MPLO is to find line parameters that meet the
constraints imposed by a fixed number 1 ď r ď h time steps
(r “ 1 reduces to PLO, and r “ h implies using all the steps).
These r time steps are equally spaced in the time horizon rhs.
The results on the OPFs and optimality gaps are very
similar to those obtained by the (single-step) PLO mechanism.
The presentation focuses on the power network attacks which
have significant differences. Figures 6 and 7 illustrates the
percentage of the load restored on the IEEE-39 bus network
for the attack strategies and settings discussed earlier, using
r “ 4 and r “ h “ 31, respectively. The results for
r “ 4 are similar to those obtained by the PLO mechanism.
In contrast, when the entire time horizon is considered, the
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Fig. 6. Active load restored (in percentage) after different attacks on the
IEEE-39 bus network with α P t0.01, 0.1u, β “ 0.01, and number r “ 4 of
time step evaluated.
Fig. 7. Active load restored (in percentage) after different attacks on the
IEEE-39 bus network with α P t0.01, 0.1u, β “ 0.01, and number r “ 31
of time step evaluated.
effectiveness of attacks on the obfuscated network increases.
This is because constraining the MPLO optimization problem
to consider each single time step in the time horizon reduces
the degrees of freedom for generating obfuscated networks
that differ substantially from the original ones.
Figure 8 further explains these results. It quantifies the simi-
larity of the attacks on the real and obfuscated networks using
the following metric to measure similarity: 100 ˆ |EoXEd||Eo|
where Eo and Ed are the set of lines selected by the real
and obfuscated flow attacks. The experiments fix the attack
budget at k “ 10% and vary the number of time steps r within
the MPLO mechanism. The figure clearly illustrates that the
number of lines chosen by both attacks grows as r increases.
When r ě 7, the two attack configurations select, on average,
up to 90% of common lines. The experiment highlights the
tradeoffs between obfuscation and network fidelity: Larger
values for r result in higher network fidelity but reduce the
effects of the obfuscation process, making the networks more
vulnerable to attacks.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a privacy-preserving scheme for the
release of power grid benchmarks that obfuscate the param-
eters of transmission lines and transformers. The proposed
Power Line Obfuscation (PLO) mechanism hides the network
sensitive values using differential privacy, while also ensuring
that the released obfuscated network preserves fundamental
Fig. 8. IEEE-39 bus’ Attack score over an increasing number of time steps,
with α P t0.01, 0.1u, β “ 0.01, and k “ 10%.
properties useful in optimal power flow. Specifically, the
released networks have dispatch costs similar to those of
the original networks and satisfy the power flow operational
constraints. The PLO mechanism was tested on a large col-
lection of test cases. It was shown to be efficient and to
produce obfuscated networks that preserve dispatch costs and
optimality gaps values. Finally, the networks released by the
PLO mechanism are shown to be effective in deceiving an
attacker attempting to damage the network components for
disrupting the power grid load. Future work will focus on
jointly obfuscating other sensitive aspects of the network, such
as loads and generators. Another avenue of future research
is to study more complex attack models, including those in
which the attacker evaluates the (near)-optimal subset of lines
to disrupt so to minimize the total load restoration.
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APPENDIX A
DETAILED PROOFS
This section provides the missing proofs. It first reviews the
sensitivity of the queries adopted in the PLO mechanisms. The
characterization of properties discussed below holds true for
the α-indistinguishability model of differential privacy [13].
Property 1: Let D “ tx1, . . . , xnu P Rn be an n-
dimensional numerical vector. The sensitivity of the identity
query QIpDq “ tx1, . . . , xnu is ∆QI “ α.
The property above follows directly from the definition of
sensitivity of queries in the α-indistinguishability model.
Property 2: Let D “ tx1, . . . , xnu P Rn be an n-
dimensional numerical vector. The sensitivity of the average
query QApDq “ 1n
řn
i“1 xi is QA “ αn .
Proof. Let D and D1 be two datasets such that D „α D1,
that is D1 differs from D in at most one coordinate and for a
factor of at most α. Denote by i be the coordinate such that
|xi ´ x1i| ď α. It follows:
|QApDq ´QApD1q| “
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ 1n
nÿ
j“1
xj ´ 1
n
nÿ
j“1
x1j
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
“ 1
n
|xi ´ x1i| (by Eq. (9))
ď 1
n
α.
l
Theorem 4: For a given α-indistinguishability level, the
PLO mechanism is -differential private.
Proof. Consider an indistinguishability value α ą 0. Algo-
rithm 1 queries the dataset of real conductance data in three
different instances:
1) To compute g˜: In Equation (15), g˜ is computed by
issuing an identity query over g. The privacy budget
used in Equation (15) is 3α . Thus, since by Property
1, Theorem 4, and parallel composition (Theorem 2),
privately computing the conductance values g˜ is {3-
differentially private.
2) To compute µ˜vg: In Equation (16), for a voltage level
v, the mean value µvg of the conductance vector g the
computation of is computed issuing an average query
QA on g. The privacy budget used is nv 3α . Therefore,
by Property 2 and Theorem 4 computing µ˜vg is {3-
differentially private. Computing the vector of mean
values µ˜g “ tµ˜v1g , . . . , µ˜v|V LpNq|g u for each voltage
level of the network is also {3-differentially private
by parallel composition (Theorem 2) since each line
belongs to exactly one voltage level set Epvq.
3) To compute µ˜vb: The mean value µb is {3 differentially
private. The argument is analogous to the one above.
Computing a privacy-preserving version of the susceptance
vector b uses exclusively privacy-preserving data (g) and
public information (r), therefore the vector b˜ defined in Equa-
tion 15 is differentially private by post-processing immunity
(Theorem 3).
Note that the optimization model of line (5) uses exclusively
privacy-preserving data pg˜, b˜, µ˜g, µ˜bq and additional public
information (i.e., the optimization problem and its optimal
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solution value). The result follows by sequential composition
(Theorem 1) and post-processing immunity (Theorem 3). l
Theorem 5: For a given α-indistinguishability level, the
MPLO mechanism is -differential private.
Proof. Note that MPLO differs from PLO exclusively in
the optimization model executed on line 4. The optimization
model does not operate on the sensitive data and takes as
input the same privacy-preserving values as those taken as
input by the PLO’s optimization model. Therefore, by post-
process immunity and Theorem 4 the MPLO mechanism is
-differential private. l
APPENDIX B
MPLO ALGORITHM
The MPLO mechanism is outlined in Algorithm 2. It
takes as input a sequence of power network descriptions
tNtuht“1 where the loads and the optimal generator dispatches
are varying over time, the associated optimal dispatch costs
tO˚ptquht“1, as well as three positive real numbers: , which
determines the privacy value of the private data, α, which
determines the indistinguishability value, and β, which deter-
mines the required faithfulness to the value of the objective
function. Recall that each Nt “ pN,E,St,Y,θ∆, s,vq repre-
sents the steady state of the power grid at time step 1 ď t ď h,
and therefore tNtuht“1 represents a network of time-series
data.
Lines 1 to 4 of Algorithm 2 are analogous to lines 1 to 4 of
Algorithm 1 executed by the PLO mechanism. They produce
the noisy conductance and susceptance vectors (lines 1 and
2) g˜ and b˜, respectively, as well as their noisy mean values
(lines 3 and 4). Since the voltage levels V LpNtq are invariant
for any t “ 1, . . . , h, the loop of line 3 uses network N1 as
a reference. Line 5 describe the post-processing optimization
step associated to the mechanism, and, similarly to that as-
sociated to the PLO mechanism, it operates using exclusively
the privacy-preserving version of the line parameters.
The multi-step PLO post-processing finds the set of con-
ductance 9g and susceptance 9b values, summarized with the
notation 9Y, by minimizing Equation (m1). This process is
similar to the one performed by the (single-step) PLO post-
processing (in Equation (s1)). The models differ in their con-
straints. While the PLO post-processing operates over a single
network, the MPLO post-processing works over h networks.
Constraints (m2) and (m3) are similar to Constraint (s4) and
(s5), respectively, of Algorithm 1. They bound the values for
the post-processed conductance and susceptance to be close
to their privacy-preserving means, for each voltage level v
and parametrized by a value λ ą 0. These constraints are
used to avoid that the post-processed values deviate arbitrarily
from the original ones. Constraint (m4) guarantees to satisfy
condition 3 of the PLO problem (Definition 2) for each
network Nt in the horizon (t P rhs). The notation costpSgi q is
used as a shorthand for c2ip<pSgi qq2`c1i<pSgi q`c0i. Finally,
Constraints (m5) to (m11) enforce the AC-OPF Constraints
(2) to (s3) for each network Nt in the considered horizon
pt P rhsq/
Algorithm 2: The MPLO mechanism for the AC-OPF
input : xtNtuht“1, tO˚ptquht“1, , α, βy
1 g˜Ð g ` Lapp 3α q
2 b˜Ð r ¨ g˜
3 foreach v P VLpN1q do
4 µ˜vx Ð 1n
ř
pijqPEpvq xij ` Lapp 3αnv q (for x “ g,b)
5 Solve the following model:
variables: Sgi ptq, Viptq @i P N, t P rhs
9Yij , Sijptq @pi, jq P EkYERk ,@t P rhs
minimize: } 9g ´ g˜}22 ` } 9b´ b˜}22 (m1)
subject to:
@v P VLpN1q, @pi, jq P Ekpvq Y ERk pvq :
1
λ
µvg ď 9gij ď λµvg (m2)
1
λ
µvb ď 9bij ď λµvb (m3)
@t P rhs :ˇˇ ř
iPNt costpSgi ptqq ´O˚ptq
ˇˇ
O˚ptq ď β (m4)
=Vsptq “ 0 (m5)
@i P Nt :
vli ď |Viptq| ď vui (m6)
Sgli ď Sgi ptq ď Sgui (m7)
Sgi ptq ´ Sdi ptq “
ř
pi,jqPEkYERk Sijptq (m8)
@pi, jq P Ek Y ERk :
´ θ∆ij ď =pViptqV ˚j ptqq ď θ∆ij (m9)
|Sijptq| ď suij (m10)
Sijptq “ 9Y ˚ij |Viptq|2 ´ 9Y ˚ij ViptqV ˚j ptq (m11)
output: t 9Ntuht“1 “ xN,E,St, 9Y,θ∆, s,vy
APPENDIX C
EXTENDED RESULTS
This section presents additional results to shed additional
lights on the attack performance of the proposed PLO mech-
anism on the IEEE-118 bus network. To do so, Figure 9
illustrates the percentage of the load being restored for the
three introduced attack strategies at a finer granularity of the
attack budget k from 5% to 10%, at varying of the indistin-
guishability value α P t0.01, 0.1, 1.0u and with faithfulness
value β “ 0.01. The results report the average values of 100
simulations for each combination of parameters.
The plots show that the real flow attacks require to damage
as little as 9% of the network power lines to produce un-
restorable damages. We observe that the network restoration
abilities after a real flow attack decrease drastically when the
attack budget increases from 8% to 9%. This is due to that
there exist a set of critical power lines, that, if collectively
damaged results in an un-restorable network. On the other
hand, when only a subset of these power lines is damaged, a
high percentage of the network loads can be restored.
On the other hand, the PLO mechanism is able to hide the
critical power lines to an attacker exploiting the released data,
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Fig. 9. Percentage of the active load restored after different attacks on the IEEE-118 bus network with α “ 0.01 (left), 0.1 (center), and 1.0 (right), and
β “ 0.01.
thus avoiding such critical restoration behavior.
Fig. 10. The IEEE-39 bus AC optimal dispatch costs differences, in per-
centage, between the original and the obfuscated networks with faithfulness
parameters β “ 0.01 (left) and 0.1 (right).
Fig. 11. The IEEE-39 bus optimality gap differences, in percentage, between
the original and the obfuscated networks with faithfulness parameters β “
0.01 (left) and 0.1 (right).
Figures 10 and 11 report the boxplot visualizations of
Figures 2 and 3, respectively.
